Naples: Sanctuary City?

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Abstract

This paper explores an emerging partnership between the municipality of Naples, Italy and local civil society organizations (CSOs) to provide improved access to rights for migrants of mixed legal status after the Italian state’s withdrawal from direct involvement in migrant management. To better understand the apparent political conflict between municipal and national policy the case is examined through the prism of the sanctuary city, revealing that existing literature based on this concept may only partially explain the Neapolitan response to the increasing neglect for—and ongoing illegalization of—migrant lives. Based on interviews with stakeholders throughout local migrant residences, drop-in centres, and municipal offices, this paper suggests that sanctuary must be considered in relation to a governance strategy which permits the de facto integration of migrants as rightless workers within the underground economy while undermining the asylum claims process. In the case of Naples, the practices of local and national authorities are not necessarily oppositional, performing different roles within a system which governs migrants through their differential inclusion. Therefore, the CSO-city effort to improve the lives of people with mixed legal status in Naples must be considered as part of the deferral of the national responsibility to asylum seekers, rather than the potential solution to their exclusion.

Key terms: Sanctuary City, De Facto Integration, Policy of Indifference, Differential Inclusion.

Abbreviations:
CSO ............ Civil Society Organization
LESS .......... Center for Studies and Initiatives to Fight Social Exclusion for Development
SPRAR ........ Protection System for Refugees and Asylum Seekers
SIPROIMI....... Protection System for the Recipients of International Protection and Unaccompanied Minors
CAS ............ Extraordinary Asylum Centres
SCCR .......... The Office of Social Cohesion and Citizenship Rights
EU............. European Union
At a time when the number of seaborne arrivals to Italy has declined to relatively small numbers, the population of illegalized people residing in the country continues to rise at a rapid pace. The large-scale migration of people from one continent to another has concluded for the moment, but as ever greater numbers of the inland asylum claimants are denied the international protection of refugee status, and visas gradually expire without possibility of renewal, more people become subject to detention and deportation. Thus, the choice of the terminology ‘illegalized people’ made here is meant to draw attention to the ways in which such illegality is a product of societal phenomenon and specific administrative choices by the host-state, rather than being attributable to any criminal or irregular aspect of migrants’ presence (Bauder 2014, 328). The 2018 Security Decree (later enacted as Law 132/2018) ordered by the Italian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini has exacerbated the ongoing processes of illegalization by eliminating the ‘Humanitarian Protection’ status which was awarded to broad swaths of recent claimants who did not qualify as Convention refugees, but were deemed too at-risk for forced removals (ActionAid and Openpolis 2019, 9). Moreover, the national decree undermined the integration system by taking the unprecedented step of denying asylum seekers access to housing and many public services until after they receive confirmation of refugee status - a process that can take as long as two years. Resultantly, by the end of 2019 the total number of illegalized people was estimated at approximately 680000-700000 and expected to continue to grow rapidly through 2020 (ActionAid and Openpolis 2019; Villa 2020). In the midst of this exclusionary turn in the national policy approach to migration a number of major cities such as Naples have advocated a liberalization of migration policy governing this mixed-status population, pushing for improved pathways to legalization and pledging to continue to provide for the basic wellbeing of migrants regardless of their legal status (Villa 2018). Unlike national,
regional, or EU authorities, Italian municipalities do not have the jurisdictional power to pass legislation of their own, however, being on the frontline facing new social challenges they are pushed to adjust or alter the everyday implementation of law in significant ways. Specifically, the municipality of Naples collaborates with local civil society organizations to maintain a loose network of helpdesks, drop-in centres, legal clinics, and residences accessible to all which improve the overall wellbeing of migrants of mixed status who have been either neglected or illegalized by the state. Aiming to explore this development further, this research explores the extent to which Naples can be understood through the conceptual framework of the ‘Sanctuary City’. The supporting fieldwork was conducted in the Metropolitan Area of Naples June-August 2019 and consists of 21 interviews with CSO and government stakeholders in the local migration management system as well as migrants of various legal status. Ultimately the findings presented demonstrate that the discussion of Naples as a sanctuary city must be considered in relation to the particular kinds of exclusion enacted by the state, which allow for the de facto integration of illegalized people into the informal economy as subordinate workers. Critically, a straightforward evaluation of the protection from the state offered by the sanctuary city policy of Naples is not possible since migrants do not directly experience illegalization through exposure to immigration enforcement and are instead subject to more subtle forms of discipline and socio-economic exclusion. Although local actors act autonomously to fill the gaps created by the withdrawal of the state, by assuming this responsibility they merely mitigate the damage caused by national policy choices, indirectly sustaining the system. The devolution of responsibility from national to local actors also disguises the translation of (national) human rights obligations owed to migrants into a set of conditional (local) rights based on conceptions of deservingness. Therefore, the findings suggest that, despite the extent to which Naples may be regarded as a
sanctuary city in its policies, the CSO-city partnership does not function as a solution to the persistent socioeconomic exclusions faced by mixed-status migrants who have become de facto residents of Italy.

The term ‘sanctuary city’ originates in the English speaking world as a way to describe the collaboration of civil society activism and municipal policy interventions to both protect populations with mixed legal status from the reach of national immigration enforcement, while also including migrants through the extension of access to certain rights (Rehaag & Lippert 2013). Since case-studies of actual sanctuary cities have been traditionally confined to the U.S., Canada, and the U.K. (i.e. Ridgley 2008; Bagelman 2016; Nyers 2019; Ridgley & Mofette 2018; Hudson 2019), recent literature on the topic has attempted to internationalize the basic concept by redefining it in terms of loose sets of characteristics observable across various national contexts: improved legality, inclusive discourse, transformative political identity, and a local scale (Bauder & Gonzalez 2018). In the case of Naples it is apparent that at the scale of the metropolitan government there has been a concerted effort to collaborate with local CSOs to encourage pathways to legal existence and establish a political stance against the discursive criminalization of migrants. Furthermore, the response of Mayor Luigi de Magistris to the incremental illegalization of migrants is indicative of an underlying political identity which may be used to justify the sanctuary city: “In Naples, we are either all illegals or no-one is illegal. This is the history of our city, but it is also our political vision” (De Magistris in Cillero 2017, 48). Thus, on the basis of this ‘globalized’ definition, Naples is an attractive place to further investigate the notion of Italian sanctuary cities through site-specific research which may determine how such an approach translates into observable outcomes for migrants.
However, the relevance of the sanctuary city framework to the case of Naples remains an open question if a narrower interpretation is assumed. The concept of a sanctuary city may be narrowly evaluated as an identifiable municipal policy approach with two observable core dimensions: (a) urban-based protection from national immigration enforcement agencies, and (b) improved access to public services for illegalized residents of the city (Kuge 2019). In regards to the first core dimension, the effectiveness of a sanctuary city may be observed by its impact on migrants’ feeling of deportability as an indicator of the social exclusion produced by illegalization; a lessened fear of deportation (within a local jurisdiction) allows for a greater level of normalcy in migrant livelihoods and therefore greater social inclusion within the city (de Genova 2002). However, this method of observing the impact of local sanctuary city interventions is not available in the Italian context since the increasingly broad illegalization of migration has not been matched by an increase in the rate of detention and deportation of illegalized people (Villa 2019, Artero & Fontanari 2019). Simply put, deportability is not a significant factor in the marginalization of migrants, and despite the rhetoric of Minister Salvini, illegalized people are de facto permitted to stay and work on an informal basis. According to the updated immigration law failed asylum applicants and visa overstays are to be detained within repatriation centres and deported to their countries of origin, but only about 5600 migrants are removed this way annually (ActionAid and Openpolis 2019, 12). Moreover, with an average cost of 5,800 Euro per repatriation, to remove every illegalized person from the country would cost a staggering 3.5 billion Euro - assuming that there are no new arrivals during that time (Ibid.). Therefore, the presence of migrants in Italy has been increasingly characterized by a sense of undeportability insofar as both migrants and the police they interact with are cognizant of the fact that mass expulsions for immigration offences are not a practical possibility in the
immediate future (Fabini 2019; Artero & Fontanari 2019). The contradictory outcome of the Security Decree is that, insofar as it diminishes accessible pathways to legal integration, it increases the number of people who will ultimately pursue de facto integration: a pathway of illegality. Thus, a straightforward evaluation of the protection from the state offered by the sanctuary city policy of Naples is not possible since migrants do not directly experience illegalization through exposure to immigration enforcement, being subject to more subtle forms of discipline and socio-economic exclusion.

This leaves the second core dimension, access to public services for illegalized people, as the remaining field within which Italian sanctuary cities may be discussed. However, the target population of the CSO-city intervention in Naples extends beyond those people formally illegalized by the state to asylum seekers, refugees and temporary residents for whom the cuts to integration supports have made the pathway to legal integration more difficult. This relates to the way in which the erosion of the asylum system coupled with the non-enforcement of immigration law has generalized the experience of migrants writ large: illegalized people become de facto residents (despite their exclusion from formal integration), while the possibility of full socio-economic participation in Italian society is ruled out for an increasingly large share of would-be refugees and legal residents. Broadly speaking, migrants of any status find themselves indirectly governed through their limited interaction with state and nonstate actors as conditional recipients of aid and through the non-coercive forms of discipline which discourage formal access to rights and encourage informal labour participation (Fabini 2018). Summarizing this dynamic, Mezzadra and Nielson theorize differential inclusion1 as a disciplinary tool.

1 The use of differentiated modalities of government to manage populations attributed to Mezzadra and Neilson (2013) is very similar to the earlier concept of ‘graduated zones of sovereignty’ theorized by Aihwa Ong (2000). She originally developed the concept to explain the changing character of South East Asian states’ relationship to their own populations due to the increasing penetration of global market forces.
whereby migrants are passively permitted by the state to exist as workers and residents, but with a limited set of social and economic rights and responsibilities relative to those of the general population, which places them in a subordinate position within the host-society (2013). Therefore, although the intervention does not neatly fit within the conventional imagination of a sanctuary city policy it is still possible to relate any effort to universalize access to municipal services to a sanctuary city policy framework. Where the municipality and its civil society collaborators can improve the intertwined processes of illegalization and differentiation which distinguish migrants from native residents, new possibilities for integration emerge. As Engin Isin insists: “The city is a difference machine because groups are not formed outside the machine and encounter each other within the city, but the city assembles, generates, distributes, and differentiates these differences, incorporates them within strategies and technologies, and elicits, interpellates, adjures and incites them” (Isin 2007, 223). In this view, the social marginalization of migrants is not predetermined by the specific kind of legal status bestowed by the state; differentiation (from normal residents) occurs in and through the city space and depends on how new arrivals are encountered. On this basis the small network of helpdesks, drop-in centres, municipal offices, and housing facilities which constitute the welcoming apparatus of Naples also forms a solid research site for an investigation of sanctuary practices. To the extent this patchwork of actors is able to collaboratively orchestrate an intervention which offers access to rights at the local level otherwise unavailable, a case can be made that Naples offers a kind of sanctuary city space for a mixed-status population subject to increasing marginalization by the state (e.g. see Artero 2020).

The fieldwork for this paper was conducted in the downtown area of the Metropolitan City of Naples over three months (June 2019 to August 2019). The research methods are based
on semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders in the emerging partnership between the municipality and local civil society organizations aimed at providing services, including shelter, access to employment, language training and legal aid. In summary, 22 in-depth interviews were conducted with staff working for several civil society organizations supporting migrants in Naples (8), civil society leadership (2), a senior municipal bureaucrat (1), as well as asylum seekers and refugees (11). Stakeholders were selected for: (a) the depth of their knowledge of irregular migration in Naples and of the changes introduced by the 2019 ‘security decree’ reforms, and (b) their active role within the integration apparatus. One governmental interview was carried out with the director of a municipal department which focused on coordinating the external offices dealing with asylum seekers, refugees, and/or irregular migrants as well as improving collaboration with NGOs and local CSOs. In these semi-structured interviews, I asked interviewees about their organization’s role within the broader migration management system of the city as well as their perception of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats facing the CSO-city partnership model in general. For a sample of the interview schedule see Appendix A. In addition to these elite interviews, I carried out semi-structured interviews with both prospective asylum-seekers and refugees who are recipients of the relevant services provided by the CSO-city partnership (9) as well as unstructured interviews with illegalized migrants who frequently access these services (2). Asylum seekers, migrants, and refugees were selected to participate for: (a) the frequency of their interaction with help-desks and the former Protection System for Refugees and Asylum Seekers (SPRAR) sites, (b) their length of stay in the country (one year minimum), (c) their age (between 19 and 40), and (d) their legal status in the country non-citizen without specialized protection (i.e. mothers or victims of torture and trafficking).
Interviewees were asked about their personal experience in Italy in general and the integration system of Naples specifically. For a sample of the interview schedule see Appendix B.

Before delving into the specifics of my findings it is essential to briefly consider Italy’s changing status-determination system for seaborne irregular arrivals. A small minority of asylum claimants ever have their claim heard and are granted international protection. The vast majority of unauthorized migrants are either waiting for their status to be determined (asylum claimants) or have fallen short of the threshold for international protection and provided with ‘humanitarian protection’ (a renewable short-term residency permit) (MSF 2018). Law 132/2018, which came as a result of the ‘Security Decree’ of Minister Salvini removes the category of ‘humanitarian protection’, thereafter the rates of rejected asylum claims have further increased, and thousands of more people a year will be unable to renew their residency permits after they expire (Villa 2018). This change is expected to increase the number of ‘illegals’ without any sort of status in Italy from the 2019 approximation of 550,000 to about 680,000 by 2020 (ActionAid and Openpolis 2019, 12). This ‘Security Decree’ also has huge ramifications for the development of an effective integration system in the country since the SPRAR, has now been replaced with the more limited SIPROIMI (Protection System for the Recipients of International Protection and Unaccompanied Minors). As the change in name indicates, the latter system is aimed at a much narrower target population of only Convention refugees and unaccompanied minors. The SPRAR was meant to replace the more commonplace CAS (Extraordinary Asylum Centres) holding centres with a more long-term and holistic approach to the integration of both asylum seekers and refugees (Novak 2019). The mission was notable insofar as it was enacted “at the local level, [with] the local institutions, in cooperation with voluntary sector organizations, [to] undertake ‘integrated reception’ interventions going beyond the simple distribution of food and
housing, [by] also providing complementary services such as legal and social guidance and support, and the development of individual programmes to promote socio economic inclusion and integration” (Sprar.it). Thus, the only purpose-built system for the large-scale integration of migrants is now restricted to the few beneficiaries of international protection and some other specific categories of protection such as unaccompanied children (ActionAid and Openpolis 2019, 2). In general, these changes further contribute to the narrowing of pathways to legitimization for migrants writ large by removing the most immediately accessible integration services after arrival and deters participation in a formal integration process that already had difficulty retaining asylum seekers (D'Agostino 2018).

During my fieldwork I asked research participants from all groupings about how Law 132/2018 (The Security Law) had impacted them to provide further contextualization of the focus of my research. The responses here reflect a generalized sense of the feeling on the ground in Naples among various groups of participants. Broadly speaking, the shift from SPRAR to SIPROIMI has been characterized by widespread confusion surrounding new processes, roles, and responsibilities among both municipalities and CSOs involved in migrant integration. In July 2019, several CSOs confirmed to me that months after the passage of the new legislation, the Interior Ministry had yet to define the exact scope of the new system. No funding schedule for the new system was in place and CSOs involved in SPRAR received a written ultimatum asking them to indicate their willingness to play a role within SIPROIMI before the terms and conditions had been finalized. The president of a CSO involved in the SPRAR project within Naples argued that by undermining the formal integration process the Security Law could lead to an increase in local instability:
These persons which are present without status across this jurisdiction—who basically compose most migrants—are excluded from the pathway to integration. What does this determine? They fail to overcome some key aspects of their marginality; they become migrants without a fixed address, they have unmet basic needs, they have no idea of whether they need to go before the local tribunal, they can’t access health services, they can't access jobs… The decree has not created more security, but more insecurity because it creates even more grave social marginalization of the disadvantaged, and marginality increases criminality (CSO-A Leadership, June 25, 2019).

It is on this basis that many local CSO actors with a history of working towards the integration of migrants have come to see the state as disinterested in, or opposed to, their work. The security law has been nicknamed the “insecurity law” by a wide range of participants from all groups of stakeholders. This perspective is reflective of the ways in which the steps taken by the Italian state to offload the problem of asylum seekers tend to reemerge as a set of local development problems. Namely, the municipality of Naples was concerned about the increase in homelessness When the first Security Decree was announced, we began to see a logical increase in homeless people... On our end we were already foreseeing a grave social situation for Neapolitans. As (migrants) began to make their way into urban life, we are seeing the typical increase in the illegality and social issues associated with street life (SCCR Director, August 10, 2019)

From the local perspective of the CSO-city partnership stakeholders the change in legislation has not reduced the fiscal burden upon Italy posed by migrants. Instead, my participants perceived the shift towards ‘Italians first’ in national policy as compounding the problems of urban poverty by offloading responsibilities of the state onto local actors.
From the perspective of the Municipality, the Security Decree has initiated a process by which immigration related issues of national importance are translated into urban poverty issues of local importance. Whereas, on the one hand, the Italian state no longer takes on the responsibility to facilitate the management of pending, rejected, or undocumented asylum seekers, city officials in Naples maintain that migrants must continue to be dealt with as residents. These persistently liberal and inclusive policy outputs by the city represent perhaps the strongest case for viewing Naples, and other Italian Municipal governments, through the lens of the sanctuary city. The Office of Social Cohesion and Citizenship Rights (SCCR) of the City of Naples has become tasked with several migration management matters, despite not having any specific responsibilities related to the legal apparatus of the national immigration system itself. Seeing as the Office is held accountable for ensuring the minimum wellbeing of the homeless and most vulnerable residents of the city, their target population has simply grown to include an increasing number of noncitizens - many of them illegalized by the state. During the interview, the Director of the Office repeatedly iterated this pragmatism: “My office specifically represents part of the welfare system of Napoli. It works with migrants insofar as they are residing in the territory of Napoli. So long as they are residents, they have rights and they are the responsibility and burden of the municipality” (SCCR Director). Yet, the city also admits that it struggles to reach the noncitizen population through its offices and therefore depends on the cooperation of local, grassroots CSO’s with closer contacts within the migrant community. In pursuit of developing a coherent CSO-city partnership the municipality has convened numerous meetings with local CSOs to increase the efficiency, scale, and range of the services which constitute the ‘welcoming apparatus’. Ultimately, the objective is to relaunch a model like SPRAR independent of the national policy direction, by relying upon CSO organizations to compensate for reduced
resources. Basically, the city is interested in encouraging a CSO operated safety net for migrants—regardless of their current legal status—insofar as it may alleviate the social issues the municipality faces when a resident becomes both acutely marginalized and beyond reach of local authorities.

During my fieldwork in Naples I was able to observe the activities of three CSOs involved in the loose, city-wide network of organizations working with migrants in various capacities: the Center for Studies and Initiatives to Fight Social Exclusion for Development (LESS), Cidis non-profit, and the Dedalus Social Cooperative. At various points in their history all three CSOs had been contracted as part of either the SPRAR and/or CAS run by the national government and in 2019 all three had elected to participate in the early stages of the municipal government’s intervention into migration management in light of the Security Decree’s negative impacts. Only LESS continues to operate some of the former SPRAR facilities housing an approximate total of 120 asylum seekers and refugees, mostly in Naples city-centre, although even these centres had ceased accepting new residents because funding has not been secured in the new SIPROIMI. Notably, the two other CSO’s had long since closed their residences for migrants years before the Security Decree of 2019, citing a progressive reduction in government funding offered per resident which had made it impossible to administer such projects in a manner they deemed ethical. Nonetheless, all three CSOs continued to operate through clinics and drop-in centres offering various services such as Italian lessons, skills training sessions, arts programming, legal assistance, and internship programs in conjunction with local businesses. For its part, the Municipality of Naples aims to coordinate the more specialized elements of the remaining service provision operations to establish a coherent system or ‘welcoming apparatus’ out of this heterogeneous group of independent, and highly targeted projects. In this regard my
participants in CSO leadership indicated there had been some success and that this was the main factor incentivizing their own participation in the intervention - not the larger political struggle between city and state.

Another important aspect to consider in relation to the sanctuary city framing of Naples is the lived experiences of inclusion and exclusion recounted by those migrants who represent the target population of the CSO-city partnership. That said, it is difficult to make any assessment of protection from the state based upon these experiences. In Naples, legality was not a major concern for migrant participants, but this is not an outcome of having found a sanctuary or a ‘city of refuge’. Rather, the migrants were not concerned because they perceived themselves to be undeportable due to the lax enforcement of immigration law. For instance, I had the opportunity to ask Mamadu, a 23-year-old asylum seeker from Guinea-Bissau, about the prospects of his asylum claim before and after he received a negative response from the tribunal:

So, if it comes out negative, I will deal with it. But look - if it does come out negative, I do not feel like I’ll be on the street or anything will really change for me here in Napoli. If I get negative, I’ll just continue on (Mamadu, 23 years, Guinea-Bissau, Asylum Seeker).

His ambivalence to the process reflects the low stakes of rejection for many asylum seekers in Naples. During my interviews with migrants I sought to uncover whether or not they felt Naples to be a ‘welcoming city’ (aside from their legal issues), and why or why not they experienced the notion of Naples as a sanctuary city to be true. Some migrants were extremely grateful simply to have been afforded decent living conditions:
I am tranquil, I am safe; I am not taking anything, and I am not dealing anything. I see a lot of Brothers sleeping on the road or doing drugs - they are not good, I have it good (Adama, 22 years, The Gambia, Humanitarian Status).

This comparative approach to assessing one’s own position in relation to an ambiguous cohort of young African men was commonplace. Indeed, migrant experiences also provide some insight into a partial success of the CSO-city partnership: many migrants had bought-in to the idea of a socially legitimate pathway to local inclusion in Naples. From this standpoint many considered themselves to have begun on a path to superseding their peers.

I come to [CSO] because they offer great educational opportunities. They help migrants. They have offered me many important lessons: Italian lessons and business lessons. They are very nice people and great teachers. Here you are allowed to work with some level of autonomy and choose the types of lessons you want to do (Mamadu, 23 years, Guinea-Bissau, Asylum Seeker).

Notably, during this interview Mamadu still felt he was on track to receiving an affirmative response to his asylum claim after a recent refugee determination hearing. Nonetheless, many migrants appreciated the general sense of social belonging provided by access to CSO services despite the limited prospects for formal regularization.

I didn’t choose Napoli - I was chosen by Napoli. *laughs* I have to say it is one of the best places. I can say that because it’s a place where most people care. I like living here. I feel like a Napolitano... What made me feel like a Napolitano? The friends I have outside the centre, where I live, the activities I engage in - they are all lively. They (Neapolitans) consider everyone a part of them and in return they give everyone opportunities to be part
of them. I would prefer to stay in Napoli for the rest of my life (Ibou, 20 years, The Gambia, Refugee).

These generally positive responses from migrants themselves may lead to a reinforcement of the idea that Naples offers sanctuary from the indifference of the national policy framework. The impression that migrants have gained a sense of belonging to Naples and self-identify as long-term residents bolsters the notion that migrants are socially included even if they do not have an obvious path to formal inclusion. However, it is important to consider these perceptions among some migrants in relation to realities non-citizens face in the long run as a result of the quality of their differential inclusion as noncitizens.

More specifically, my findings suggest that, in a context where de facto integration of migrants as both permanent residents and essential workers is all but assured, the pretense of liberal policies disguises the reality of subordination within the host-community. As Fabini observed regarding the differential inclusion of the undeportable population of Italy, “newcomers are disciplined when they agree to occupy a subordinate position within the receiving society” (2019, 182). In this light, the principle of ‘autonomy through work’ which forms a core value of the CSO-city partnership must be reconsidered as a strategy of governance. The ‘autonomy through work’ ethos is shared by almost all CSO participants, from the leadership to the frontline staff:

We do this because the basic idea of our system is that the young men will become autonomous after they’ve been received. Insofar as reception must finish at a certain point, after reception they must survive alone and be autonomous and this is the way it is. So, we try to offer whatever instruments possible and useful for them to individualize their reception in whatever way we can (CSO-A Leadership, June 25).
Insofar as ‘autonomy through work’ frames success and failure on the pathway to legitimization as the individual responsibility of migrants it instills hope for equality in an imagined future and thereby encourages compliance with legal systems. Yet, in practice the system fails to significantly alter their *de facto* trajectory towards integration as cheap labour without rights for the vast majority. A former irregular migrant who arrived in Naples in 2015 and now works as an interpreter and cultural mediator in one of the few remaining SPRAR residences in the city provides a perspective on the pathway to legitimization that bridges the two groups of participants.

The first thing is getting up and going to school every day rather than simply waiting. The second part is ensuring that you are integrating in a legal manner not an illegal one.

(CSO-A Cultural Mediator, June 16, 2019).

During this conversation he clearly reflected the gatekeeper role adopted by most frontline CSO-workers to keep migrants on track. However, he also went on to nuance this position by emphasizing the damage done to the sustainability of this model by the Security Decree and the resulting shift towards the more poorly funded CSO-city partnership. Namely, he highlighted the fact that the centre where he worked - having not received funding for several months - had reduced the amount of available food and eliminated the weekly pocket money previously afforded to migrants.

If they were able to do the exact path that I took, they’d be fine. If they had the opportunity to go to the commission after having Italian lessons, after having some vocational training, they’d be fine. But instead, they go without Italian lessons because they are forced to find work on the black market. So those guys who are leaving the
system, they won’t end up on the street for the most part, but they’ll be outside - outside society (CSO-A Cultural Mediator, June 16, 2019).

In summary, my findings in this area suggest that de facto integration outcomes are not significantly altered by the welcoming apparatus of Naples, which is practically unable to compensate for the state’s withdrawal from active migrant management. On the other hand, the apparatus still structures the views of many migrants, and CSO frontline staff by reframing widespread marginalization as a question of individual pathways to legitimization. Indeed, many migrant participants argued that Salvini’s harsh stand on asylum seekers was needed to weed out the ‘bad’ migrants among them:

I know Salvini is making things difficult for us Africans, but we must demonstrate we are not thieves, that we are workers. If you are paying taxes you should be able to stay, if not you should go home” (Giddo, Humanitarian Status, The Gambia, 21 Years).

According to Vaughan-Williams the individuation of politics, observable through the focus on ‘autonomy’ and ‘work’, is an absolute necessity for the constitution of (noncitizen) subjects within the Western host-state. “Like the modern sovereign state, the modern political subject is also conceived as being fundamentally bordered in terms of autonomy before the law,” which allows for their subordination as individual workers without access to power (Vaughan-Williams 2009, 3). Thus, the mixed status population is made easier to manage by encouraging migrants to pursue their individual economic aspirations, distracting from the denial of rights to the broader population resulting from the asylum system. Ultimately, one of the most significant results from the devolution of management from the state, to the city and the CSO ‘welcoming apparatus’ is the deferral of the fiduciary responsibility owed to asylum seekers in international.
Therefore, the intervention is not obviously at odds with the national border regime in practice, and primarily aims to mitigate the most damaging effects in terms of societal cohesion at the urban level. The realities of a neglected national system trickle down, disrupting the everyday functioning of the CSO-partnership’s intervention and undermining the very possibility of an approach founded upon ‘autonomy through work’. As one of my participants explained: “This being a project which has always been about the promotion of autonomy, we typically seek to send the guys on their way alone... However, as it happens, when the guys go alone to a public office they get turned away or ignored” (CSO-A SPRAR centre manager, July 3). In practice administrative civil servants refuse to acknowledge migrants as residents and justify this exclusion based on invented or distorted bureaucratic requirements aimed to deter accessing services. “It’s certainly a narrow-minded approach to things, however, unfortunately, this is how the state works” (CSO-A SPRAR centre manager, July 3). For the time being, the city has been unable to alter these preexisting dynamics.

This discussion cannot be divorced from consideration of the outsized role of the underground economy in Italy, and within Naples in particular. In Naples, so-called black or grey business accounts for a large share of the economy employing large numbers of native Neapolitans and migrants alike. Formal work contracts can be difficult to come by, even for native Italians living in the city, due to the fact that most low-skill work can be done cheaper and with less regulatory hurdles by paying daily wages in cash or goods and services. Furthermore, some participants I spoke with argue that the new arrivals simply exaggerate pre-existing socioeconomic divisions and the marginalization of working-class Neapolitans:

In many ways the poor of Napoli — without jobs, education and infrastructure — are not full citizens. Therefore, status is not necessarily the most important question (for
migrants). Many people have been able to secure legal status, but this does not guarantee an improvement in their lives (CSO photographer, August 12, 2019).

This widespread opinion among CSO workers is significant because one of the principal pathways to formal legalization for migrants and failed asylum claimants is to obtain a work visa through a year-long contract with an Italian employer and CSOs have dedicated a fair amount of resources to assisting migrants in this pursuit (i.e. ‘autonomy through work’ based projects).

Additionally, of those migrant participants with active asylum claims most were aware of the high probability of rejection but understood a negative outcome as a limitation of job opportunities rather than a likely end to their time in Europe. Perhaps counterintuitively, in a context of undeportability, migrants who are illegally employed can even be perceived as more socially legitimate than status-bearing refugees, who are perceived as burdensome or a criminal threat (Artero & Fontanari 2019). This may be explained by the emphasis upon determining a migrant’s socioeconomic ‘deservingness’ observed by Spencer & Delvino (2019). Interestingly, not a single migrant participant or CSO worker cited detention and deportation as a serious risk to their integration in Italy, while the Director of SCCR did highlight the growing number of migrants incarcerated for criminal offences. This is reflected in research which demonstrates that many police end up mediating between acceptable and unacceptable degrees of illegality rather than merely enforcing the law, while municipal civil servants produce less explicit exclusions by creating administrative roadblocks that prevent the vast majority of migrants from ever achieving substantial access to their legal rights (Artero 2020). Thus, although migrants are excluded from the full rights of citizens it is evident that they are still expected to play a (subordinate) role within Italian society, and therefore are already disciplined by Italian law and societal norms.

Yet, the differential inclusion of migrants is also viewed as problematic, generating a severe
urban marginalization which several stakeholders in the CSO-city partnership expressed serious concern about:

This is a big gift to the Camorra (the Neapolitan Mafia network). A big gift. Because these guys who end up in the street, without documents, without work and hunger in their stomachs will find a way to feed themselves. In the end they will feed themselves criminally if necessary. That’s why, we call it the ‘insecurity decree’. It ends up being a problem for us Italians sooner or later, in fact, the problem returns much worse. Ignoring them is therefore extremely foolish (CSO-A SPRAR manager and former migrant, July 8, 2019).

Therefore, the decree’s practical effects are insecurity because closing SPRAR centres has pushed many migrants outside the pathway to legal existence. It becomes difficult to organize a CSO-city partnership which promotes pathways to legitimization through formal legal means when even those in possession of refugee status still go without sufficient food and shelter due to government cuts. Meanwhile, the pathway towards de facto integration in Naples offers immediate access to livelihoods based on informal work. In this way, municipalities which participated in the administartion of SPRAR are actually scaling back their ambitions and offloading responsibilities to civil society, hoping to mitigate social damages and reduce the fiscal burden of national policy changes as much as possible.

The initial question of this research, whether Naples constitutes a ‘Sanctuary City’, does not have a straightforward answer. Nonetheless the investigation of this question has revealed some theoretical limitations of the conceptual framework in the Italian context. Namely, the undeportabilty which has accompanied the increasing illegalization of migrants, as well as the correlated phenomenon of differential inclusion, suggests that sanctuary must be reconsidered in
relation to the shifting strategies of migration management pursued by the Italian state.

Undeportable, but rightless, the de facto policy outcome of increasingly limited government action is the progressive integration of migrants into the large informal economy of Naples. I have argued in my analysis that this de facto resolution should be viewed through the prism of governance through *differential inclusion* - a phenomena visible across Italy (Fabini 2019).

Firstly, this is supported through the observation that the welcoming apparatus of Naples perpetuates the notion that migrants should prove their deservingness as individual workers to gain a conditional social or legal legitimacy in the city. Secondly, migrants are channeled towards de facto integration within the informal economy by a deteriorating asylum claims system which impedes pathways towards legal existence. Finally, migrants assume a subordinate role within Italian society as de facto residents and workers, but less-than-citizens. In this way migrants are both marginalized within the informal economy and the limits it places upon their access to rights, but also the subject of societal discipline aimed at managing their continued existence as de facto residents. In summary, this integration outcome may be described as a *differentiated inclusion* which tracks a trajectory towards a segregated society with different access to rights for different kinds of members. Neither can such an outcome be described as a sanctuary for migrants, nor does the CSO-city partnership—in its current form—constitute a challenge to such processes. A key takeaway from my fieldwork was that the urban host-communities in which I was embedded were becoming ever less stable and secure communities for both migrant and native-born residents.

The decree has not created more security, but more insecurity because it creates even more grave social marginalization of the disadvantaged, and marginality increases criminality (CSO-A Leadership, June 25, 2019).
This highlights the unfortunate fact that although the sanctuary city interventions examined here may provide an ethical response to the state’s withdrawal from host-communities they are far from providing a solution to the absence of a coherent integration programme for an increasingly legalized population. Migrant lives in Naples have become locked in a vicious cycle of marginalization as the pathway to socially legitimate existence is being closed off and, given time, this could lead to increased crime, violence, and further social disintegration in the city.
Bibliography


Appendix A: Sample Interview With Participants Working with Migrants

1. What kind of service(s) does your organization provide to migrants?
   Che tipi di servizi sono forniti dalla sua organizzazione per i migranti (Richiedenti Asilo, Titolari Protezione, Minori non Accompagnati, Migranti in generale)?

2. How long have you been providing this service?
   Da quanto tempo offre questi servizi?
   a. Can you tell me a bit more about the history of the organization?
      Mi può dire qualcosa di più sulla storia dell’organizzazione?

3. What kind of funding supports these activities?
   Da dove arrivano i fondi per sostenere l'attività dell'organizzazione e i servizi che offre?

4. Has the ‘Security Decree’ impacted your operations in any way?
   Il Decreto Sicurezza promosso dal Ministro dell'Interno Salvini ha impattato in qualche modo sul vostro lavoro?

5. What are the documentation requirements to access services?
   Che tipi di documenti sono validi o necessari per l’accesso ai servizi?
   a. Is the residency card an important piece of documentation to access services here?
      L’iscrizione anagrafica (a Napoli o altro comune) è’ necessaria per l’accesso ai vostri servizi?

6. Of the migrant population, who cannot access your services?
   C’è qualcuno tra i migranti che non può accedere ai vostri servizi?

7. In your personal opinion, should migrants be removed from the community at some point?
   Secondo la sua personale opinione, i migranti dovrebbero tornare nel proprio paese di origine ad un certo punto (ad es. Alla fine di un conflitto) o potrebbero stabilirsi in Italia senza alcun limite temporale?

8. If no, what role should migrants play in the future development of the community?
   Se hai risposto no, quale dovrebbe essere il ruolo sociale dei migranti (nel senso di diritti e obblighi sociali) nello sviluppo della comunità’?

9. What are your thoughts on the specific efforts by Luigi de Magistris to include migrants in the future of Napoli?

10. Cosa pensa degli sforzi del sindaco Luigi de Magistris per l’inclusione dei migranti e per rendere Napoli una città più accogliente?

11. Do you have anything else you would like to add or that you think I should know about Naples in general?
    Ha qualcosa da aggiungere o pensa ci sia qualcos’altro che dovrei sapere su Napoli in generale o utile per la mia ricerca?
Appendix B: Sample Interview with Migrant Participants

1. What’s your name?
   *Come si chiama lei?*

2. How old are you?
   *Quanti anni hai?*

3. Where are you from?
   *Da dove viene?*

4. How long have you been in Italy? In Napoli?
   *Da quanto tempo resta in Italia? In Napoli?*

5. How did your arrive in Italy?
   *Come sei arrivato in Italia?*

6. What made you decide to come to Italy?
   *Perché ha deciso di venire in Italia?*

7. Have you made a request for asylum?
   *Lei ha richiesto d’asilo?*

8. What was the outcome?
   *Come’ andato il richiesto d'asilo?*

9. How did/do you feel about the process?
   *Cosa pensava di questo processo?*

10. How long have you been receiving assistance from X organization?
    *Da quando viene da questa organizzazione?*

11. What kind of documentation do they require from you?
    *Che tipi di documenti sono validi o necessari per l’accesso ai servizi?*

12. How has your experience with this organization been in general?
    *Come’ stata la sua esperienza con questa organizzazione in generale?*

13. Why did you come to Napoli? Is there anything in particular about this city which makes it an attractive destination?
    *Perché e’ venuto a Napoli? C’è qualche aspetto della città che lo rende una destinazione più accogliente?*

14. Do you feel like part of the community here?
    *Si sente come una cittadino di Napoli o come uno straniero?*

15. Do you expect to stay in Napoli long term and to build a life here?
    *Pensa che starai a Napoli per stabilirsi?*

16. What is the greatest difficulty in trying to live in Naples? Other cities?
    *Cos’è la problema primiera che i migranti si affronte vivendo a Napoli?*

17. Do you think that relations between Italians and Immigrants are worsening or improving in general?
    *Generalmente, lei pensa che il rapporto tra i cittadini Italiani e gli immigranti stanna migliorando o peggiorando? Perché?*

18. Do you know anything about Minister Salvini and how immigration politics are changing in Italy?
    *Sa qualcosa di Ministro Salvini e come sta cambiando le politiche d’immigrazione in Italia?*
19. Do you have anything else you would like to add or that you think I should know about Naples in general?

*Ha qualcosa da aggiungere o pensa ci sia qualcos’altro che dovrei sapere su Napoli in generale o utile per la mia ricerca?*
### Appendix C: List of Primary Sources

#### 1) Participants Working With Migrants

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<tr>
<th>CSO</th>
<th>Position/Description</th>
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<td>Municipal Director, Office of Social Cohesion and Citizenship Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CSO Photographer (freelance)</td>
<td>August 12</td>
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<td>CSO-A</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
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<td>CSO-A</td>
<td>Social worker and former migrant</td>
<td>July 12</td>
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<td>SPRAR centre manager</td>
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#### 1) Migrant Informants

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<th>Age</th>
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